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8: THE ROlE OF THEWITNESS 
IN ATHENIAN LAW 
Gerhard Thür 
I 
T he authority of the great philosopher Aristotle and the sugges-tive power ofhis systematic mind misledthe compilers of older handbooks on the law in Athens and clouded their view of
Athenian legal procedure. In their chapters on evidentiary procedure, 
they accept the five "nonartistic proof!;" (atechnoi pisteis) canonized by 
Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1375:124): nomoi, martyres, synthekai, basanoi, 
and horkos (laws, witnesses, contracts, confessions under torture, and 
oath).1 More recent studies have recognized that only one form of ev-
idence, witnesses, had legal significance in the practice of the Athenian 
jury courts. 2 Aside from a few regulations governing witness testimony, 
Athenian law had no legally specified rules of evidence. We cannot take 
the various methods of finding truth in modern law as a natural given, 
nor can we uncriticallyapply those standards to the large Athenian courts 
(dikasteria). In Athenian law, the principle of determining the truth is 
not primary, but rather the principle of equal opportunity:3 both pros-
ecutors and defendants should have a fair opportunity to present their 
positions to a body of fellow citizens selected objectively and not influ-
enced by bribery or pressure. This assembly of jurors decides the case 
immediately after the speeches, rendering their first and final decision 
without deliberating or giving reasons. Their verdict is a simple yes or 
I Lipsius (1905-1915 : 86~00), Harrison (1 971: 133-54), MacDowell (1978: 242-'7). Fol-
lowing the modern legal categories more closely, Banner (1905), Banner and Smith (1938 , 
II7-44). 
, Thür (1977' 31~), Todd (1990: 33) and (1996: 96f.). 
J Thür (2000: 49). 
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(guilty or not guilty). In Athens, legal conflict was apart of direct 
:ID<>Cr:aCv. The Athenians thought that if the democratic principles of 
lrness were obeyed in court, then the broader goals oflegal procedure, 
as truth and justice, would best be assured. 
The democratic regulations include: the most equitable allotment 
",>lU«;; ofjurors from all ten tribes (phylai) ofthe citizens on the day 
the trial and their distribution among the dikasteria; allotting each 
seat within the courtroom he already had been allotted to; and 
double allotment that assigns the available court magistrates to pre-
over of the dikasteria in session that day. Before the moment of the 
ieann.g· neither the litigants nor the court ·official know which citizens 
be deciding the case. By rnixing up the jurors (dikastai) from all ten 
and then further rnixing up their placement, supporters of the 
)ro,se<;ut:or or defendant are prevented from forrning groups within the 
I"U'~O (that numbered from 201 to 1501) and disturbing the delivery of 
speeches. Through this procedure and through a perfectly organized 
ivst,em of voting by secret ballot, an objective decision - at least as seen 
an external perspective - is best guaranteed. The entire process is 
ies<;ntJed in the Athenaion Politeia (Chapters 63-69; composed some-
after 335) with great attention to detail and has been confirmed by 
arcna,eO.LO!l~lC:l1 evidence.4 A further, very simple mechanism also con-
.trlltJut:ea to the principle of equal opportunity: exactly the same amount 
time for speaking was measured out for the prosecutor and defen-
dant by a waterclock (klepsydra). The times ranged from approximately 
fIfteen minutes (five choes of water) for the simplest private case to ex-
actly one-third of the day for the most important political cases. The 
length of the day was calculated according to the daylight of the shortest 
day in December (Ath. Pol. 67.2-5, unfortunately only fragmentarily 
preserved; cf. Harpokration diametremene hemera). 
The list of nonartistic proofS I mentioned at the beginning is also 
related to the time allowed for speaking and the litigants' method of 
pleacling. In contrast to the speech, which was composed by a logog-
rapher according to the art (techne) of rhetoric and delivered by the 
litigant himself and his supporting speakers (sunegoroi), these nonartistic 
prc)ots were , written documents5 that the court secretary (grammateus) 
aloud at the request of the speaker. In court, no speaker ever held a 
lcICUm(!nt in his hand and read it aloud to the jurors. While the secretary 
the waterclock stopped, unless the time allotted to the speaker was 
• Rhodes (1981: 697-735), Boegehold (1995)· 
s Gagarin (I990: 24),. "Evidentiary material." 
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calculated according to the length of the day, because the day cannot
be lengthened. Among the exarnples of the written documents that the 
secretary read aloud outside ofthe allotted speech time, Ath. Pol. (67.3) 
names law (nomos) and witness testimony (martyria), but two other types 
of documents, which rnay have been located in the gaps that precede and
follow in the text, can perhaps be added.6 The documents used by the 
litigants in the main trial before the jurors are collected during arbitra-
tion and then placed in two containers called echinoi (we now know that 
these were day jars),7 which were then sealed and brought into court
so that the documents could be read aloud. In a weIl-preserved section 
of the Ath. Pol. (53.2) discussing the preliminary hearing before the of-
ficial arbitrators (diaitital), three types of documents are listed (again as 
examples): witness testimonies (martyrial), formal challenges (proklesefs), 
and laws (nomoI). Neither in practice within or outside of Athens8 nor 
in rhetorical theory9 was there agreement on a firm number or typol-
ogy of documents that were read out before the court; a litigant was 
free to decide what he wished to have read aloud. By interrupting the 
coherence of his speech he did run the risk that the jurors would lose 
interest or become irnpatient and begin to protest. But according to the 
court speeches and the more general sources cited above, witness testi-
monies in moderate numbers IO were a standard part of the trial process 
in the Athenian courts as weil as in sirnilarly organized court procedures 
elsewhere. 
The litigants' and their supporters' entire performance in court 
basically served to provide proof(pistis) oftheir own side ofthe case. The 
litigants' presentations became credible and convincing both through 
the narration of the facts, strengthened by additional arguments from 
probability (that is by "artistic proofs," entechnoi pisteis), and also by 
reading aloud written documents ("nonartistic proofS," atechnoi pisteis) 
whose precise wording was objectively deterrnined ahead of time, thus 
removing them from the art of rhetoric. But the rhetorical handbooks 
naturally show how to include these documents in the argument. Seen 
6 The text probably enumerates: [psephisma], nomos, marftyria, symbolon]; see Rhodes (1981: 
722). 
7 Boegehold (1995: 79-81), E 1 (T 305), fourth to third centuries B.C.; Wallace (2001). 
8 Ath. Pol. 53.2: martyriai, prokieseis, nomoi (also 53.3); 67.3: see above, note 6; [PArk 17.42-6 
(Styrnphalos, 303-300 B. C.) : martyriai, syngraphai; IvKnidos, I (IK 41) 221 (Syll.3 953) 43- 5 
(KaIymna, circa 300 B.C.): psephismata, prokieseis, grapha tas dikas, allo eg damosiou, martyria. 
9 Aristot. Rl1et. 1.2 (1355b36): martyres, basanoi, syngraphai; 1.15 (1375a24): nomoi, martyres, 
synthekai, basanoi, horkos; Anaxim. Rl1et. 7.2: martyres, basanoi, horkos. See Mirhady (199Ia), 
earey (1994). 
10 See the statistics by Todd (1990: 29) and Rubinstein (2004) (appendices). 
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way, it is only logical that rhetorical theory includes "laws" 
the nonartistic proofS as objectively preexisting texts that are 
,aloud by the secretary, even though legal statutes, now just as then, 
a status completely different from facts that are affirmed but (in the 
sense) remain to be proved. 
Like laws, all other nonartistic proofS except witness testimony 
also be excluded from the law of evidence as we understand it 
tdctaY. To prove the authenticity of a contract or other document read 
by the secretary, the speaker relied entirely on witnesses. In the 
time of the trial, the popular courts had no chance to exarnine the 
of a document. Certainly litigants could setde the matter 
1H~;iiU of time in a preliminary hearing - in the anakrisis before the court 
~iiJ.alglstrate or in the official arbitration (diaita, see below) - or also in a 
l&F-ilval:e meeting. If someone wished to refer to a' document such as a will 
"'!'ll • .u5 the trial in front of the jurors (Dem. 36 .7; 46.8), he summoned 
"11.1,1""''''' and challenged his opponent beforehand either to concede 
the copy was true or to open the sealed original that was deposited 
a third party for safekeeping. If the opponent granted that the copy 
true and the original document was authentie, then "proof" of the 
:10(;UI]rleIltwas unnecessary. Ifhe refused the formal challenge (proklesis), 
Dw,eveT. those present as witnesses at the time would confirm this in 
trial, and following the mIes of rhetorical art, the speaker would 
,1r,w his own more or less detailed conclusion about the accuracy of 
ilie copy and the authenticity of ilie original. 
The challenge (proklesis) issued before witnesses also is important 
for the rhetorical argument about the two remaining nonartistic proofS, 
slave testimony under torture (basanos) and oath (horkos). Both of these 
could be described as evidence in today's sense, but Athens was peculiar 
. iliat these types of evidence took place outside of court, not before 
ilie jurors. These procedures, interrogation under torture and oath, be-
'-0.,,,'- relevant to the trial only if both parties agreed. Because slaves 
,,prp not normally allowed in court as witnesses, a litigant could inter-
LU~'U,C: his opponent's slaves under torture about a particular topic only 
his opponent agreed. Il In the same way, the parties could agree that 
would accept an oath sworn by the other on a particular subject. In 
challenges it is often suggested that the decision for the entire case 
,UUIl.llU depend on the outcome of these, procedures taking place outside 
court. 12 But in most cases it remains merely ilie suggestion of one 
Thür (1977). 
Thür (1977: 214-32). cf. Mirhady (1996) and Thür (1996b) . 
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party, because the opponent does not, as a rule, accept the challenge. 
But even in these cases, the speaker can have the written text of the 
challenge read to the jurors and confirmed by the witnesses presentat 
the time, and can draw his own conclusions, as Aristotle recommends 
(Rhetoric r. r5). Then, the nonartistic proof as a document isnot the exact 
text of a testimony under torture or a sworn oath, but rather the text 
of the challenge, where the contents of the interrogation or of the oath 
to be sworn are recorded precisely. Thus only the fact that the chal-
lenge happened is proven, not the contents of the challenge that was 
proposed to no effect. 13 For Athenian procedure, then, more precise 
than Aristotle's textbook on rhetoric is Ath. Pol. 53.2, where he gives 
the documents typically sent by the public arbittator to be read aloud to 
the jury courts as "laws, witness testimonies, and challenges," without 
worrying about the broader application of the challenge. 
When describing the law of evidence in classical Athens, necessar-
ily in the terrninology of modern law, we should not make the rnistake 
of seeing the list of nonartistic proofs, which merely groups together 
a few types of documents coming from outside the court speech, as 
a systematic account of evidence in our sense. Evidence (pistis) in the 
rhetorical sense is a general means of peisuasion, not oflegal proof. 
II 
From the considerations put forth thus far, one can conclude that -
contrary to rhetorical theory and against the expectations of a modern 
observer - only one type of evidence, witnesses, was used directly in 
the procedure before the jury courts. The narrow time frame alone in 
which the trial took place suggests that the process of presenting wit-
nesses' testimony in Athens was essentially different from modern evi-
dentiary procedures. In the following sections the few rules governing 
the testimony of witnesses will be discussed: (r) witness qualifications, 
(2) witness formulas and types of testimony, (3) arbitration and witness 
obligation, (4) the witness in the main trial, and (5) the false witness. 
In Section III, we will consider the function ofwitnesses inthe overall 
structure oflitigation at Athens. 
(r) The first question, who is allowed to be a witness in the 
dikasteria, already shows that Athenian law was far from exhausting all 
possibilities of determining material truth. Only free adult males were 
IJ Thür (1996b: 1)2) against Mirhady (1996). 
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allowed to be witnesses. Slaves of either gender, as previously men-
tioned, were normally subjected to interrogation under türture carried 
out jointly by both parties outside of court. In the court speeches, the 
parties often mention having challenged each other, but no evidence . 
of this kind is ever used in a trial, or even mentioned as being used. 
Likewise, the . knowledge women held, which was often decisive in 
inheritance speeches, could be introduced only indirectly. Either the 
woman affirmed her knowledge outside of the court through an oath -
in Dem. 29.33, and 55.27, for example, the speakers challenge their 
opponents to agree to it but no oaths are sworn - or the woman's 
male authority (kyrios) testified for her (Dem. 57.67) with her consent 
(Isai. 12.5). A woman did not appear in court on her own behalf, ei-
ther as a litigant or witness, nor could she be held legally responsible 
for perjury or for the false testimony of her kyrios. Foreigners, how-
ever, couId be witnesses, perhaps by special regulations or agreements 
between states. 
Whether slaves and women could testify in private homicide cases 
is disputed. '4 Anyhow, the sacred foundations ofhomicide law resuIted 
in several peculiarities, above all solenm oaths. Aside from homicide 
cases, slaves managing their businesses independently couId apparently 
litigate and testify about their own affairs. 15 From these regulations we 
see that the ability to testify did not depend on a person's mental capacity 
but was seen as the privilege of appearing in public on one's own, before 
citizens assembled as jurors in court. 
Litigants and their sunegoroi undoubtedly had the right to speak in 
court, but were they also authorized or obligated to appear as witnesses? 
A litigant couId not be a witness in court in his own case in order to 
increase the credibility of bis plea (Dem. 46.9). OnlY ina diamartyria 
could someone be a witness in his own case (Dem. 44.42; Isai. 7.3), 
but such cases did not involve a witness testifying in court but rather 
a formal deposition before the archon that he must not hand out the 
inheritance to more dist:mt relatives because legitimate sons exist. 16 
After a diamartyria, the archon's hands are tied unless formally effective, 
extrajudicial testimony is eliminated by a successful suit for false witness 
(see Section 11.5). 
Just as a litigant cannot force his own testimony on the court, he 
also cannot force his opponent to be a witness: "The two litigants must 
.. Harrison (197 I: 136). 
15 E. Cohen (1992: 96-8). 
16 Wolff (1966: 122), Harrison (1971: 124-31); for other forms of diamartyria, see Wallace 
(2001). 
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answer each other's questions, but are not obligated to be witnesses" Oaw 
cited in Dem. 46.10) . This rule refers prirnarüy to pretrial procedure. 
In the anakrisis (prelirninary exarnination) before the magistrate or in 
the public arbitration, each litigant prepares step by step the case he 
will present in a continuous speech at the trial in court. We can call 
this the "dialectical" stage of procedure, in contrast to the "rhetorical" 
stage, when his timed pleading is cohesively presented in court. 17 In 
pretrial proceedings a litigant questioned and challenged his opponent 
before witnesses, and, as we will see, the litigant had to show to his 
opponent allthe documents that would be read aloud in court, which 
could provoke more questions and challenges. At every step, either 
litigant must cooperate to ensure a fair preparation for the main trial. 
This obligation, however, does not extend to compelling one party to 
testify for the other. 
What is forbidden for the litigants for obvious reasons, however, is 
permitted for their supporting speakers (sunegoroi), who argue alongside 
them in court. As a result, a paradigmatic trial strategy developed of 
presenting the sunegoros as a witness immediately before he gave his 
supporting speech (Isai. 12.1, 4; Aisch. 2.170, 184), thus emphasizing 
that, like a witness, the sunegoros himself risks a suit for false testimony. 18 
The extant speeches from witness trials show that their testimonies 
were in fact attacked under every conceivable pretext, whereas the only 
risk that the sunegoros faced - that he would be prosecuted for "paid 
legal assistance" - was negligible: the acceptance of müney was difficult 
to prove, but it was quite easy to twist the wording of adeposition 
and present it as false. It is easy to delineate the boundaries between 
sunegoria and witness testimony, when a witness said nothing but merely 
conflrmed a written document that was read aloud in court, but the 
difference may seem problematic during the period when testimony 
was presented orally - ostensibly in one's own words. 19 This problem is 
only apparent. As I will soon show, even oral testimony in fact adhered 
to a fixed formula that clearly distinguished it from the unconstrained 
speech of the sunegoros. 
(2) Particularly informative are the witness formulas, which, un-
like the issue of oral versus written testimony, have received too little 
attention until now. The witness accepts responsibility that astatement, 
carefully formulated ahead of time, corresponds to the truth. Beyond 
17 Thür (1977: 156). 
18 Rubinstein (2000: 7 1). 
19 Rubinstein (2000: 72-5) . 
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he gives no further information of any kind to the court. In the 
century this statement was cornmonly prepared before the pre-
hearing by the litigant who wanted to present the testimony in 
and was written on a whitened wooden tablet (Dem. 47.n). Al-
throughout, the wording adheres to a set formula. Mter the name 
witness or witnesses come, for example, the words "testifies to 
nO'NlIill! that Neaira was a slave ofNikarete and ... " (Dem. 59.23) or 
"~<lhhT to knowing that Phylomache, Euboulides' mother, was con-
the sister of Polemon ... " (Dem. 43.35). The formulaic verb 
(eidenai) introduces a subordinate dause that precisely expresses 
.. fact to be proven. The same formula, "to know" something, is used 
~sp,ecllty the subject about which a slave will be interrogated under 
"~r·h,,·,. in a private basanos procedure: "I requested from him [Onetor] 
slaves who knew that the woman lived with him in marriage ... " 
\,U'''l<. 30.35; reporting a challenge).20 
In witness testimonies, the verb "be present" (pareinai, paragen-
, is also used in a similar way as "know": " . .. testify to having 
present before the arbitrator when Philomache defeated all other 
;1<1.11H"H., to the estate" (Dem. 43.31). "Having been present" is nor- . 
induded in the testimony of witnesses who were surnmoned to 
JU~.U1C;" transactions or important procedural transactions. By contrast, 
persons who testify that they "know" are accidental witnesses to 
event. A third formulaic verb for expressing the subject of witness 
 testimony is "hear" (akouein): " ... testify to having heard from their 
father that Polemon had no brother but a sister, Philomache" (Dem. 
43.36). Such hearsay evidence was only allowed if the informant, the 
bearer of "knowledge," was already dead. Sometimes the witness's re-
lationship to the litigant is recorded in the deposition just before the 
subject of the testimony, particularly to point out kinship and therefore 
the competence of the witness (" .. . testifies to being a relative and to 
having heard ... " Dem. 43 .42; cf. 35-46) . The three different formulaic 
wOlds that introduce the subject of the testimony are also [ound in the 
legal regulations underlying the speaker's argument in Dem. 46.6-'7: 
"The laws prescribe that a person should testify to what he knows or 
: events atwhich he was present, and that this should be recorded in 
a.dlocun:J.eIH so that no one could delete something from, or add so me-
to, the written text. They do not allow testimony from hearsay 
.VV ''''c someone is still alive, but only after his death." 
'0 Thür (r977: I28f.). 
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Trus passage could give the impression that a fixed formula was 
only introduced with the written form of testimony. Scholars dispute 
not only the date when the Athenians changed from oral to writ-
ten testimony but also the reason for trus change.21 Theinnovation 
is probably connected with the reform of pretrial procedure, when the 
circle of those responsible was expanded to include all sixty-year-old 
citizens who, as "arbitrators by lot," performed a similar function to 
the archons in the anakrisis, preparatory to trial." In fact, the clay jars 
(echinoi) in wruch documents for trial are stored (Ath. Pol. 53.2, see 
above, Seetion H. I) are mentioned in connection with public arbitra-
tion. 2) Presumably public arbitration, which was established soon after 
the restoration of the democracy in 403/2, needed more stringent public 
control than the 'prelirninary hearing before the archons. When witness 
testimony was subrnitted in written form, a litigant could be confident 
that in the main trial rus opponent would not change the wording of 
the testimonies announced at the arbitration. For trials in wruch the 
same archon presided over both the preliminary hearing and the main 
trial, trus risk was minimal. These conclusions, however, are not directly 
provable from the soure es. The only certainty is that from the 370s, at 
the latest, speakers in court asked the clerk to read out the witness 
testimonies, whereas in the fIfth century, they asked the witnesses "to 
speak."24 
Giving oral testimony is typically understood as if the witness de-
scribed relevant facts to the court in rus own words,25 whereas a ftxed 
formula was only introduced along with written testimony. Two pas-
sages in particular are cited as evidence that witnesses recounted events 
in their own words: Andok. 1.69, "They will mount the speaker's plat-
form and speak to you as long as you want to listen ... "; and Lys. 17.2, 
" ... they will recount to you ... and testify. "26 Upon closer exarnina-
tion, however, both speeches contain clear runts that oral testimony 
was already couched in the above-stated formula. For instance, An-
dokides (1.69) asserts that the relatives he saved from the death penalty 
"knew" the information best; we can therefore assume that as wit-
nesses, they described their rescue with similar statements using eidenai 
,. Rubinstein (2000: 72-4), with references to earlier works. 
U See Scafuro (1997' 126f. and 383-92) (opposed in part by Thür 2002: 408f.). 
'3 However, the only known exarnple of an echinas (above, n. 7) comes from an anakrisis. 
'. Leisi (1908: 8Sf.), Rubinstein (2000: 72, n. 143). 
'S Bonner (1905: 46f.), Leisi (1908 : 86f.), Rubinstein (2000: 72), Gagarin (2002: 138), contra 
Thür (1995: 329). 
,6 Rubinstein (2000: 73). 
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("know"). And the restriction that follows - "as leng as you (the 
 judges) want to listen" - refers grammatically not to the content of 
 the witnesses' statements or their speaking, but rather to the number 
of witnesses who, pronouncing identical formulas, would be coming 
up to the speaker's platform (bema). For good reason (cf. I.47) An-
 dokides has not called all eleven relatives mentioned in 1.68 but al-
ready stopped the process earlier. The alleged desire of the jurors to 
listen (or not) is a rhetorical trope, like the challenge to the jurors in 
1 .70 to request the completion of an argument that just ended. In the 
second passage (Lys . 17.2) both verbs known from the formula are in 
fact used: "those who 'know' more than land 'were present' when 
that man concluded the deal will recount to you and testif)r." Here 
too, obviously, the witnesses' narratives consist in the recital of for-
mally introduced statements that were agreed on with the litigant ahead 
oftime. . 
From these passages, one can conclude that in the change from oral 
to written testimony only the medium, not the formula, changed; what 
was previously stored only in memory was now documented. Further 
evidence that oral testimony follows a fIxed formula is the diömosia, 
the statement that a witness in a hornicide case must give under oath, 
which is also introduced with the verb "know" before the introduction 
ofwritten testimony (Ant. I.8, 28). In the same way the subjects about 
which slaves are to be tortured, in the fIfth and into the fourth centuries, 
ai-e formulated consistently as what the slave "knows. "27 
We may conclude that the boundary between witnesses and 
sunegoroi was always clear. The witness used formulaic words and was 
responsible for each and every word of his formulaic statement under 
dike pseudomartyriön (suit for false testimony - Section 11.5). In the pe:" 
 riod of oral testimony, the memory of the participants was obviously 
sufficient to ensure the wording, but in accordance with the bureau-
cratic regulations of the restored democracy, testimony proceeded from 
the pretrial stage to the main hearing and, if necessary, to the suit for 
false testimony in the form of an unalterable document. 
(3) If we follow the course of a trial, the witness testimony (that, 
as we have seen, in each case was prepared and formulated by the parties 
in private) fIrst appears publicly during the pretrial proceedings. In the 
scholarship, both the purpose of the different types of pretrial proceed-
ings and the function of the witnesses in the whole trial are disputed. 
 The fIrst issue can be considered only briefly here, the second will be 
·7 Thür (1977= 128, n. ISS; 131 ). 
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treated more fully later (III), after the overill legal framework of the 
evidence from witness testimony is clarified. 
During pretrial proceedings, the witness ftrst had to state his view 
ofthe prepared testimony. Ifhe refused to appear, he exposed himselfto 
compliance by force. Cases that fell under the jurisdiction of one of the 
nine archons went through a preliminary hearing called the anakrisis. 28 
Presumably, at this time the archon would have checked on his authority 
to administer the case and any other formal requirements before con-
ducting the trial in a court session under his control. It is thought that 
the other trials, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Forty (Ath. Pol. 
53 .I-3), would have been prepared totally differently: these trials would 
have to go through arbitration before a public arbitrator (diaitetes) , a 
sixty-year-old citizenchosen by lot; but each party could "appeal" the 
arbitrator's decision, and a "higher court" presided over by one of the 
Forty made the decision. 
Steinwenter9 has already shown that the arbitrator's verdict was 
at most the basis for a free and arnicable agreement between parties, 
but otherwise was not legally binding. If the parties did .not come to 
an arnicable agreement, the trial took its normal path toward the sole 
binding decision of the court. As mentioned above, the legal conse-
quence of public arbitration rested only in the fact that the parties 
"could use no documents other than those placed in the echinos be-
fore the arbitrator" (Ath. Pol. 53.3). We can thus see the procedural 
purpose of public arbitration as (in addition to attempting to end the 
confiict arnicably) fairly preparing for the main trial. Following dialec-
tical rules, the parties were supposed to clarify their opposing positions. 
As its name ("exarnination") suggests, the anakrisis before the archons 
also had this dialectic nature, though the archon did not question the 
litigants (at least not about formal requirements) but rather the litigants 
exarnined each other.30 Because echinoi are never mentioned in the 
literary sources in connection with the anakrisis, Lämmli31 concluded 
that the rule of fairness was not in force there and new documents, 
even witness testimonies, could be introduced until the beginning of 
the main trial. The discovery of a lid with an inscription showing that 
the echinos held documents from an anakrisis32 proved the opposite. 
Accordingly, the litigants had to let each other see all their evidence 
>8 For details, see Harrison (1971 : 94-105). 
'. Steinwenter (1925: 68-73), LämmIi (1938: 92). 
JO Thür (1977: 76). 
J1 LämmIi (1938 : II7) still generally followed, see Wallace (2001: 98). 
J' See above, n. 7. The Iiterary sources examined by LämmIi (1938) need further discussion. 
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in every procedure before the main trial. J3 This does not mean, how-
ever, that witnesses gave testimonit!s in the anakrisis or in the public 
arbitration. 
Because the witness did not give testirnony in either pretrial pro-
ceeding, he was not liable under dike pseudomartyriön for his appearance 
there. However, he was responsible for appearing at the pretrial pro-
ceedings before either the archon or the arbitrator chosen by lot. Each 
litigant had the opportunity to summon (kalein, proskalein) privately a 
person he would present as a witness. In pretrial proceedings, the witness 
had to declare if he would confrrm the formulaic testirnony presented 
to him in court, or would at once "swear himself exempt" by an oath 
called exömosia (pollux 8.37): "He must either confrrm or swear himself 
exempt that he does not know or was not present." From the words used 
by the lexicographer, clearly taken from the formula for witness testi-
mony, it is easy to see that in the exömosia the witness does not excuse 
himselfby "not knowing" ; rather, he takes an oath that the statement 
devised by the litigant and formulated as the witness's knowledge is not 
true. A witness swears "not to have been present" if he denies that he 
was summoned for an act oflegal significance. Denial under oath, how-
ever, has no legal consequences; a witness can be prosecuted under dike 
pseudomartyriön only if he confirrns astated fact during the trial before 
the jurors. From Dem. 45.58, we leam that the exömosia normally took 
place before the trial, in this case at the public arbitration, and that the 
oath ceremony claimed a considerable amount of time. Moreover, Ath. 
Pol. mentions (55.5; cf. 7.1) that, as a particularly celebrated oath, the 
exömosia was sworn on the stone before the Stoa ofthe archon basileus.34 
Instead of swearing oneself exempt, an unwilling witness could 
also decide to stay away from the proceeding altogether; however, he 
thereby exposed himself to legal force by the litigant who summoned 
him. One source (Dem. 49.19-21) gives information about this, during 
arbitration, but much of this account remains unclear. 35 The witness 
Antiphanes did not appear at the last session of the public arbitration 
in which his testirnony should have been placed in the echinos. The 
passage states clearly that testifYing before the public arbitrator meant 
nothing more than introducing the formulaic testirnony in the presence 
33 IPArk 17.43-46 (Stymphalos, 303-300 B. C.) has the same regulation; cf. the commentary 
on p. 236. 
34 The lithos has been excavated in front ofthe Stoa, Rhodes 1981, 136; 620. Ath. Pol. 55 .5 is 
speaking about the exömosia generally (contra Carey 1995b: IIS) ; cf. Lyk. 1.20 (see below, 
Section II.4 and Appendix) . 
3l Harrison (1971: 141f.). 
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of the witness. Out of fairness, the identity of the witness and the 
wording of his testirnony had to be revealed to the opposing litigant. 
The arbitrator could only accept a deposition in the presence of those 
who would confrrm them in court. Because Antiphanes did not appear, 
Apollodoros, who had summoned the witness in vain, paid "a drachma 
for the refusal of a witness to appear" before the elose of the arbitration 
(49.19). 
Apollodoros then brought a suit for avoiding testirnony (dike lipo-
martyriou) against Antiphanes to prosecute him for the damage (blabe) 
he had caused (49.20). Of course, Apollodorus incurred damages only if 
he were to lose the main trial.36 Nevertheless, ifhe mentioned in court 
that the arbitrator did not consider the defendant, Timotheus, guilty 
after he waited until night for the witness to appear, but inStead ruled 
in his favor, he is still not making an argument for damages but is rather 
accusing the absent witness . Oddly enough, in the main trial Apol-
lodoros still tries to get Antiphanes to confirm two statements under 
oath (49.20). From this passage, we can conelude that Antiphanes was 
actually present in court, but most likely as a witness for the opponent. 
Apollodoros' irrelevant challenge to Antiphanes to swear an oath on the 
spot is meant to disguise his failure at the arbitration to get Antiphanes 
to show up as witness for his side. Dem. 49.19 has been wrongly un-
derstood to mean that a witness can be sentenced to pay the amount of 
damage caused by a "broken promise" to appear. 37 By comparison with 
a parallel regulation from Stymphalos, however, it is elear that to avoid 
becoming liable to a penalty the witness had to comply with a private 
summons, even without consenting.38 
In the remaining sources from Athens, it is not from arbitration 
that the witness is absent, but rather from the main trial. This topic 
will be discussed in the next section. There are no sources dealing 
with the absence of a witness from the anakrisis, but at least for polit-
ical trials we can speculate (Section 11.4). Naturally, no force could be 
used against inruviduals who had already been convicted twice for false 
testimony, because a third conviction threatened them with disenfran-
chisement (atimia) (Hyp. 2.12). As a consequence, they were also ex-
empted from swearing an exömosia. This regulation explicitly protected 
)6 If Apollodoros won his case against Timotheus, the same problem would have arisen as 
in a diki pseudomartyriön by a winning party (see below, Seetion 11. 5); in both instances, 
the loss is not financial, but rather one of reputation. 
37 Lipsius (1905- 1915: 659); contra Harrison (1971: 142f.). 
38 [PArk 17;10-14 (303-300 B.C.): "to not be present" after being summoned could result in 
being penalized for the entire arnount oE the claim. 
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 even those witnesses who "had been present," when sumrnoned at busi-
ness transactions - a stipulation that could have caused trouble for some 
parties involved in a contract case. Nevertheless, these individuals could 
still appear as witnesses of their own free will. 
(4) At the conclusion cf the arbitration process, which could ex-
te nd over several sessions, the thesmothetes determined a time for the trial 
(Ath. Pol. 59.1). A court had to be available with adequate capacity for 
the size ofthe jury. For private suits, 201 or 401 jurors were needed (Ath. 
Pol. 53.3), and 501 for most public cases. The trial had to be conducted 
according to a strict schedule because of the costs associated with jury 
payment. A court could decide several cases on the same day. Because of 
the pressure of time and the large number of jurors, only rudimentary 
means were developed for presenting one's evidence. The most impor-
tant tool for persuading the court were the speeches of the two litigants, 
each forming a cohesive unit. The length of their speeches was deter-
mined exactly by the time measured out by the waterclock (klepsydra). 
The trial was the domain of rhetoric. A litigant could lengthen the time 
of his presentation as much as he wanted by having documents read 
aloud because then the waterclock was stopped, but this tactic ran into 
psychologicallimitations; the audience, fellow citizens serving one day 
as jurors, preferred to hear exciting stories rather than dry ac counts of 
deeds. 
Evidence from witnesses also had to fit into these limits. The most 
important features have already been mentioned: at the trial the witness 
had to appear before the court in person and had to go up to, or onto, the 
speaker's platform (bema). There, he had to either recite the formulaic 
testimony himself or, later, confirm it silently by nodding after the 
secretary read the text aloud. He never had to answer any questions. 39 
Qnly the fact that he was there in person, that he was either praised or 
insulted by the litigants in their speeches, and that by testif)ring he risked 
a suit for false witness gave the jurors an idea whether he was telling the 
truth in the testimony created for him by the litigant. The jurors had an 
important criterion for assessing the testimony in the rule that before the 
jurors voted, the litigants had to announce by episkepsis if they wished 
to bring a dike pseudomartyriön against a witness (Ath. Pol. 68.4). No 
.further measures for evaluating the truth of a testimony were available . 
to the court. Because the verdict in the dikasterion occurred simply by 
39 The unique "questioning" of a witness in Andok. 1. 14 is nothing other than the deposition 
pronounced by the party himself and the witness answering " [ know." An anakrisis of a 
witness is mentioned only in IilKnidos 221 .67~2 (see above, o. 8). 
I ~ C) 
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a vote without deliberation (Ath . Pol. 69.1) and no ,easons were given, 
no one could know what influence a particular witness had exerted on 
the outcome of a trial. 
Under these circurnstances, it is evident that the litigants were 
given the means to compel a witness to appear for the main trial too. At 
the trial in court, unlike the preliminary proceedings, the witness took 
personal responsibility for the truth of the facts asserted by the litigant. 
Forcing a witness to appear was not conceivable in Athens. Compulsion 
could only be applied indirecdy through fines or penalties. We must 
keep in mind that by swearing the exömosia a witness could avoid all 
responsibility for the content of the statement. For practical reasons, the 
exömosia was already sworn during arbitration. 40 
One simple means of indirecdy forcing a witness to appear before 
the court was to have him officially summoned (kliteuein) by the court 
secretary (Aisch. 2 .68). In view of the harsh sanctions that accompany 
this official summons, we must assume that kleteuein is allowed only 
against absent witnesses (me elthein, Lyk. I.20) who had already been 
summoned by the litigant and appeared du ring the preliminary hearing. 
Only someone who is prepared for his appearance before the court, or 
who is present but. not willing to go to the speaker's platform, can fairly 
be put under pressure by being officially summoned. 
Kleteuein has different consequences in private and public casesY 
Although we do not know what means of compulsion could be used 
against a witness who failed to appear for the anakrisis in a public trial, 
we are well-informed about the next stage and the compulsion used to 
get witnesses to appear in court and approach the speaker's platform. It 
is certain that a reluctant witness in political trials had to pay a fine of 
a thousand drachmas (Aiseh. I.46). According to the general view, the 
witness had to pay this fine only if he did not approach the speaker's 
platform when summoned. The thousand drachma fine is exacdy the 
same penalty a prosecutor had to pay ifhe abandoned his case or received 
less than one-fifth of the votes (Dem. 21 .47) . Just like the prosecutor, 
the witness in political trials should not yield to threats or bribery, after 
he has already taken a position during the preliminary hearing. For the 
most part, a witness in a public trial could not be held accountable for 
material damages (blabe) as a witness in a private suit could. Therefore, 
a fixed fine, paid to the state, seerns appropriate.42 
4° See Appendix and above, n. 34. 
4' first seen by Rubinstein (2004) . 
., Rubinstein (2004: I09-II). 
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Only in the anakrisis of a public trial was someone who sum-
moned a witness uncertain whether he would confirm the testimony 
in the main trial or take the exömosia at once. This situation is best 
suited for the almost formulaic expression used in connection with 
kleteuein, "the witness may (in the future) confirm the testimony or 
(irnrnediately) swear the exömosia." Perhaps one can conclude from this 
that kleteuein was also permissible in preliminary hearings along with 
the. fme of one thousand drachrnas, of course only against witnesses 
privately surnrnoned according to the rules. 
In private cases the expression "kleteuein" is used only once in 
a comparable sense (Dem. 32.30). Because a witness who has already 
failed to appear at the public arbitration - as shown above - is prosecuted 
with dike lipomartyriou for blabe (Dem. 49.20), it is unlikely that the 
penalty of 1,000 drachrnas would also be irnposed on hirn for failing 
to appear in court. Perhaps kleteuein in private cases was a procedure 
like episkepsis, undertalcen before the vote as a condition for bringing a 
dike lipomartyriou,43 to take revenge for sustained damages or an injured 
reputation. Dem. 32 .30 deals with none of these questions. Failure to 
appear as a witness in court was clearly not a cornrnon problem in private 
suits. 
In sum, we can assume that a litigant was able to compel witnesses 
to appear both in preliminary hearings and in the main trial. Although 
the exömosia was sworn only in prelirninary trials, the witnesses who 
exempted themselves under oath still had to go before the jurors in 
the main trial and stand by their oath in person. This is indicated by 
those passages we have thus far exarnined - and refuted - as arguments 
that an exömosia could also still be sworn before the court. These pas-
sages, however, can best be explained by the rhetorical device offeigned 
uncertainty. 
The texts cited thus far deal with reluctant witnesses, but Athenian 
law also solved the problem of witnesses who were unable to appear at 
the main trial because ofillness or travel. Before the trial, these individu-
als, in the presence of other witnesses, confirmed the testirnony formu-
lated by the litigant in a procedure called the ekmartyria (Dem. 46.7).44 
The original testirnony of the absent witnesses and the testimony of 
 the present witnesses that they were properly transmitting the original 
.3 Rubinstein (2004: n. 22) undersunds kli teuein here as the "formal summons to a legal 
action" ; but the international political affair in Dem. rB.r50 is not comparable to the 
private one of the poor metic Protos in Dem. 32. 
« Harrison (1971 : 14M.) ; similarly, IvKnidos 221.47-65 (above, n. 8); Pap. Hal. 1.7D--73 . 
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testimony were combined into a single document, in which the testi-
monies of the witnesses who were present in court were added at the 
end of the original deposition that the absent witness had given be-
fore the trial (Dem. 35.20, 34.). An ekmartyria could be attacked at the 
end of the trial in a single episkq,sis for false content as weIl as for false 
transmission. 
(5) Only after the verdict was it possible to test the truth of testi-
mony taken during the trial. If a party had promptly protested through 
episkepsis against one of his opponent's witnesses,45 he could bring a 
suit for false testimony (dike pseudomartyriön). We do not know what 
happened if the litigant did not bring suit after his episkq,sis; perhaps 
the simple attack was considered hybris. Deposition suits were mostly 
directed against false statements, but in the case of diamartyria, they were 
also brought against false legal claims (e.g., one's status as the legitimate 
son of the deceased was disputed in the deposition suit). Finally, suit 
could be brought against filing an inadmissible deposition, one based 
on hearsay from a person still alive. It is gene rally accepted that the 
prosecutor's goal in this type of suit is to receive payment of a fme in 
the amount of the damage (blabe) that resulted from the testimony.46 
This sanction is meaningless, however, if the winner in the main trial 
brings adeposition suit (Lys. 10.22; Isokr. 18.54-56) or if a witness who 
testified in a public trial is prosecuted. In these cases, it is not a mat-
ter of material damage, but only of one's injured reputation, which to 
be sure always played a role along with blabe. Because a witness who 
had been convicted three times lost his civil rights, it might have been 
enough for the prosecutor to bring the witness one step closer to atimia. 
It is unclear if, and under what conditions, the trial could be reopened 
after the conviction of a witness (anadikia).47 We can assume that, as a 
rule, the conviction of the witness did not set aside the verdict of the 
main trial. 
III 
The present study tries to understand witness testimony strictly from 
the procedural rules in effect in Athenian jury courts. Here at the end, 
I will fIrst summarize the most signifIcant conclusions, which deviate 
., JG IF I258 (32412 B.C.), honoring the prosecutors for entering an episkipsis in time. 
,6 Harrison (1971: 144), Thür (1987= 406-12), as against Bonner (1905: 92), Berneker (1959: 
1370). 
' 7 Harrison (1971: 192--'7), Behrend (1975). 
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. in part from the general opinion. Then finally, I will give my view of 
the purpose of witness testimony in the overall concept of litigation in 
-Athens. 
The fact that the five "nonartistic proofS" are given from a rhetor-
not a judicial, perspective yields the important conclusion that in 
the legal process witness testimony is the only enforceable means of dis-
covering the truth in court - and even this only to a modest extent. It 
is undisputed that restricting the capacity to bear witness to free males 
restricted the search for truth. There is also agreement that written 
testimony - a statement formulated by the litigant that the witness only 
silently confirmed - did not promote the discovery of truth in court. It 
is a new realization that a fixed formula was also used in the period of 
oral testimony; in my opinion, the witness never recounted events in 
his own words - thus, he was always clearly distinct from a sunegoros -
and was never questioned or cross-exarnined in court. 
Both types of prellminary hearings, the anakrisis and the public 
arbitration, serve as preparations for the main trial. The most important 
tool in this "dialectic stage" of the procedure is question and answer 
between the litigants. The witness is obliged to appear there and must 
deeide if he will at onee swear an oath that the statement prepared by 
the litigant is false (exömosia) or if he will confrrm it in the main trial. 
The exömosia should not be understood as an exeuse of not knowing, 
but rather as a negative assertion, denying the content of the testimony. 
If the witness did not appear at the preliminary hearing, then in a private 
suit, after reeeiving a private summons, he had to pay a penalty to the 
litigant for damages, and it is possible that in a publie trial, after ·being 
offieially summoned (kleteuein), he had to pay a fme of one thousand 
drachmas to the state. Because public arbitration, as we have known 
for a long time, did not end with a definitive verdict, but rather with 
the arbitrator's decision that was not binding at all, we carmot speak 
of giving evidence at this stage. In both types of preliminary hearings, 
the wording of the entire deposition and the identity of the witness 
or witnesses were to be made known to the opposing litigant on the 
prineiple offairness (though this is disputed for the anakrisis). 
The main trial can be characterized as a batde of speeches - the 
"rhetorieal stage" of the judieial process. Speaking or reading aloud 
the short, formulaie testimony, even one denied by exömosia, earried 
ittle weight, at best, in the overall speech. Contrary to the claims of 
previous seholarship, an exömosia sworn before the jurors in the main 
rial is not attested. It is also a new finding that in eaeh case the witness, 
whether he eonfirmed the testimony or already swore the exömosia in 
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the preliminary hearing, must approach the speaker's platform and show 
himself inperson to the jurors. In public trials, a wit~ess who did not go 
before the jurors after being summoned both by the litigant and officially 
was fmed 1,000 drachmas. In private cases, he was perhaps penalized 
with a fine in the arnount of the darnage or simply with a guilty verdict. 
A perjured exömosia thus had the serious social consequence of public 
stigma, but only the testimony positively affirmed by a witness (martyria) 
had legal consequences. The witness exposed himself to a suit for false 
testimony (dike pseudomartyriön) and could be convicted and fined the 
arnount of the damage; in each case, he risked the loss of civic rights 
(atimia), which occurred after a third conviction. The extant speeches 
from these trials show that attacks on witnesses consist ofhair-splitting 
quibbles (see, e.g., Thür 199T 252-5 on Dem. 47); the main weapons 
are the emotions aroused in the previous trial where the deposition 
originally was given. 
Thus far I have attempted to reconstruct the legal principles of
witness testimony in the Athenianjury courts. Now we can finally turn 
to the identity of the witness. Who were the people who approached 
the speaker's platform alongside the litigants and their sunegoroi? What 
function did they have in the interaction between the litigants and their 
fellow citizens selected as judges? In the past twenty years this issue has 
prompted profound and continually refmed analyses of the entire corpus 
of court speeches. The results TI1USt be placed in the legal frarnework of
witness evidence. Humphreys (1985: 322 and 353) very rightly denies 
the thesis - which, in any case, was never proposed in this form - that 
witnesses in classical Athens acted as oath-helpers. The institutional 
prerequisites for this, in fact, are entirely lacking. In the time of the 
orators, the verdict in an Athenian trial never depended on an oaththat, 
as in Gortyn, a court magistrate could impose on one of the litigants 
or his supporters. Nevertheless, Humphreys understood witnesses as 
supporters and followers of the litigants and grouped these into types 
of inner and more distant circ1es. She explained this as resulting from a 
court system that presumed the rural mentality of a face-to-face society 
that, however, found itself becoming an urbanized society by the end 
of the fifth century. The primitive system of the Athenian dikasteria 
has conserved that mentality. Comparing Athenian law suits with those 
of other Mediterranean agonistic societies D. Cohen (I995 : I07-I2) , 
without going into legal details, holds that giving testimony, also a false 
one, was a noble act of farnily and kinship solidarity. 
Todd (1990: 31f.) created distinctions based on the statistical fre-
quency of witness testimony in the speeches; witnesses are much more 
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i ;f()UIlld in private cases than public ones, where the sunegoroi more 
i'app,ear.48 Rubinstein (2004) combines the statistically supported 
:rerlce between private and public trials with the substantive crite-
;\QI>nc~w dose in every single case the personal connections were 
wc;c;u, the witness and the litigant. In this way, she reveals the different 
, 'of compelling testimony; she assigns the fine of 1,000 drachmas 
:an official summons (kleteuein) only to public trials. In these she 
finds the long overlooked figure of the neutral wimess. 
As already emphasized, the legal structure exdudes the possibility 
' ."'~~"h-helpers in dassical Athens. Already in Draco's law (621! 0) the 
e'jJLlLL in a homicide case occurs not by an exculpatory oath but by 
vote of a panel ofjudges, the Ephetai (JG P 104.13). Nevertheless, 
formulaic language of dassical wimesses is reminiscent of the for-
of oaths. Witnesses in a homicide case, like oath-helpers, had to 
an oath that was formulated in tenns of "knowing" either the 
or innocence ofthe defendant (Ant. 5.12; 1.8,28), and "know" is 
of the words that introduce the content of the testimony, that is, the 
,,"'JlW,"'" in the formula of the deposition that requires confirmation. 
' the formula, which is similarly used in oral and written testi-
nuny, was too little noticed until now, the archaic character of witness 
teSltlITlOrlY at Athens was also unrecognized. Here we carmot investigate 
origins of archaic witnesses in the practice of oath-helpers. But the 
 fact that the fornth-century formula reaches back to earlier times allows 
the condusion that the view of the wimess as primarily a helper and 
friend of the litigant did not originate in the fourth century. Along 
with the formula, the peculiarity of Athenian witness testimony, that 
the witness, without being questioned, merely confirmed a statement 
formulated by one of the two litigants, can also be dated to the time of 
oral testimony. Therefore, the strict polarization of witnesses between 
one party and the other also cannot be an innovation ofthe fourth cen-
tury. All this confirms the assumption that the wimess in an Athenian 
trial was - from a legal perspective - a helper of one of the litigants 
more than an instrument for judicial truth finding. 
Not to be overlooked, however, are the tendencies in the oppo-
site direction.49 The risk ofbeing prosecuted by the opponent for false 
wimess after the trial bound even the dosest supporter to the truth. By 
,8 For reservations. about the use of statistical methods see Mirhady (2002: 262- 4) , who 
stresses the function of witnesses as a means for finding the truth. 
49 These are stressed by Mirhady (2002) and especially for citizenship and inheritance trials 
by Scafuro (1994: 157, 182), who calls witnesses in these cases a "living cornmunaJ archive." 
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analyzing the court speeches, however, we ·see that testimony was very 
often employed that is legally irrelevant or slightly beyond the truth. On 
the other hand, even testimony that was by all appearances completely 
truthful was attacked with flimsy . arguments by a dike pseudomartyriön. 
Statistics about the extant testimonies cannot take all these imponder-
ables into consideration. In view of the residual risk that even truthful 
testimony before the Athertian dikasteria brought, the conjecture seerns 
justified that neutral witnesses too were asked for their support by the 
litigants ahead of time. To sum up, each trial had its own individual 
agenda depending on the subject ofthe conflict and the litigants' strate-
gies of argumentation, and this deterrmned the witnesses to be selected 
and the formulation of appropriate statements to be confrrmed by them. 
General considerations so far support the condusion that litigants 
chose their witnesses aceording to the subjeet ofthe testimony from the 
eirde of their dosest supporters er at least from those who were weIl 
intentioned toward them. Nevertheless, the legal sanetions that eould 
affect a reluctant witness may tell us something different: the indireet 
compulsion of a fine for not appearing as a witness in the prelirninary 
hearing or the main trial eould - in theory - serve best to determine 
the truth objeetively. But the means of coereion lay in the hands of the 
litigants who also formulated the testimony. The first stage,summoning 
a witness to the preliminary hearing, eompelled him to take a stand 
either for or against the litigant who had summoned him. Either the .
witness agreed to put the previously formulated statement on the reeord 
and to have it used in the main trial or he swore at onee a solernn oath 
that the statement was false. With the latter, the exömosia, he dedared 
hirnself a supporter of the opposing litigant. At a seeond stage, the 
litigant eould compel a witness who had appeared in the preliminary 
hearing to go before the jurors in the main trial. The compulsion to 
testify was, therefore, not so much a tool for fmding the truth; rather, 
it served most of all to align the witness as the supporter of one litigant 
or the other. Neverthe1ess, clever logographers succeeded in finding 
arguments for the truth of a statement denied by the witness even when 
an exömosia was delivered; they branded witnesses who were present in 
court and supporting their opponents as perjurers (Aisch. 1.47; Dem. 
45.60; sirnilarly, Isai. 9.18). ' 
The identity ofthe witness and the eontent ofhis previously for-
mulated testimony are inseparable. For every single testimony, the legal 
information in the sources reveals a strict polarization of the witnesses 
in favor of one party or the other. Through deverly formulated testi-
mony, litigants - if not their logographers - suceeeded time and again 
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~<o,.".LU5 supporters of an opponent, who shied away from obvious 
to testify for their side. 50 The superficial impression that the 
was an unconditional supporter of one litigant was qualified by 
masterful manipulation of a witness's duty to testify. 
ApPENDIX: EXÖMOSIA AND KLETEUEIN 
scholars agree that the exömosia (oath of disclaimer) was sometimes 
',ur,rn directly before the jurors during the main trial (Rubins tein 2004, 
15 with further references), but the direct sources, including two 
.assagt!s from private suits connected with compulsory testimony and 
from publictrials, speak convincingly against an exömosia taking 
in court. 
In the prosecution ofStephanos for false witness (Dem. 45), Apol-
,0dO[()S accuses Stephanos of stealing a document with witness testi-
mn,nv and adds that people present at the time can testifY to this (45.58) . 
then has the testimony he wishes these witnesses (who are Stephanos' 
trie:nds) [ead out (45.60) and directs them either to confirm or deny it 
UHU<::l oath. The caption Exömosia follows and directly afterwards Apol-
101:10:ros tries to convict the witnesses of perjury, implying that they swore 
exömosia (45.61). But the charge that Stephanos stole the documentis 
insignificant, and it is out of the question that Apollodoros and the wit-
nesses went to swear this exömosia at the stone by the Stoa of the basileus 
during the trial, leaving the jurors with nothing to do. Even if the oath 
ceremony could have taken place in court, it would have interrupted 
and thereby destroyed the logical progress of the well-constructed story 
(45.57-62). Thus, Apollodoros's uncertainty (45.58) is fabricated. He 
presents his evidence for the supposed theft as concisely as possible with 
two documents and the single word Exömosia, referring in all probability 
to an exömosia that had already taken place during the public arbitration 
and was not repeated in court. 
The speaker in Isaios 9.18-19 proceeds along the same lines, but 
is not so creative. He summons Hierocles, who has testified for his 
opponent, as a witness far his side. This time the exömosia is read aloud. 
speaker then attempts to show that Hierocles' exömosia is perjury 
.19) . But it ismost unlikely that in this rather short speech there is a 
U".d.A in the speaker's description of mutual hostility between the two 
farnilies just as it is reaching its peak. Here too, then, the document 
so For examples. see Harrison (1971: 140 n. I) (add Dem. 29.20) . 
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read aloud was presumably only an exömosia that had taken place in 
a preliminary stage. We can conclude that in both cases the witnesses 
appeared during the main hearing even though in all probability they 
had already sworn the exömosia in the preliminary hearing. There is no 
mention of any kind of compulsion. 
In four public cases, the speakers threaten their witnesses with 
kleteuein (an official summons)Y In Aisch. 2.68, the speaker success-
fully ensures the appearance of his witness at the speaker's platform; the 
possibility of swearing the exömosia is not even mentioned. In Dem. 
59.28, the witness is formally given the choice either to confirm the 
deposition or exempt himself under oath. When he does neither, the 
speaker threatens him with kleteuein. Here too the testimony is ob-
tained. In the same way, only in more words, Lykurgus (1.20) proceeds 
against three groups of witnesses. Even though the last two passages 
mention the possibility of witnesses exempting thernselves under oath, 
no thing in the actual depositions indicates that witnesses did or would 
make use of this possibility. Also in these passages, the speakers only 
put rhetorical pressure on their witnesses to confirm the prepared state-
ments at the speaker's platform. To encourage the witnesses to confirm 
their testimony, Lykourgos uses the analogy of military obligation and 
warns against desertion from the batde lines (lipotaxia) , which is eas-
ily associated with lipomartyria, the failure of witnesses to appear. For 
rhetorical balance, he also explains the possibility of exömosia in detail, 
although his reference to the solemnity of the oath that (as we know 
from Ath. Pol. 55-5) was sworn at the Stoa of the basileus, must have 
made it obvious that it was technically impossible to swear the oath 
du ring the main trial. But the speaker's actual argument gives no indi-
cation of the different time frames. Perhaps the formulaic alternative in 
the last two passages, "testify or swear oneself exempt," originates from 
the formula for kleteuein that developed for the preliminary hearing (see 
above, Section II.4). 
An entirely different situation presents itself in Aisch. 1.44-50 in 
the affair of Misgolas. Here too the three possibilities are fIrst described 
at length: Misgolas could confirm the testimony that he had sexual re-
lations with Tirnarchos, not appear and pay the I,ooo-drachma fIne 
for ignoring the summons, or swear the exömosia as a perjurer (1.46f.). 
Aischines has already prepared for the last possibility by 6ling other 
depositions affrrrning the acts (1.47) , but he presents his evidence in 
reverse order, fIrst calling other witnesses and only at the end calling 
\1 For kli teuein in private cases see above Seetion [1.4. 
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Misgolas. Thus, he has already expressed doubt that Misgolas will 
t.U.LllLl1H the statement (1.50). The rhetorical tactic is obvious: Aischines 
leaves the jury uncertain whether Misgolas had already exempted 
himself from the testimony during the anakrisis. Then, under the threat 
kleteuein and the penalty of I ,000 drachmas, Aischines forces his wit-
 ness before the jury to stand by his oath that has already been rhetorically 
branded as perjury by the depositions previously read aloud. Just as in 
the case discussed above about the supposed theft of a document in 
Dem. 45 .60, here also the evidence about sexual relations is creatively 
provided through adeposition that was never confrrmed. Because the 
 jurors do not get to see the documents before the trial, the speakers are 
able to enhance the suspense of their speeches by presenting an already 
sworn exömosia as if the witness at that moment had not yet decided on 
it. The stylistic device of feigned uncertainty is particularly suitable for 
the themes of martyria, exömosia, and kliteuein, a fact that must always 
be considered when interpreting such passages. 
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